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Abstract
In this paper we study the mechanics of “leading by example” in
teams. Leadership is beneﬁcial for the entire team when agents are
conformists, i.e., dislike eﬀort diﬀerentials. We also show how leader-
ship can arise endogenously and discuss what type of leader beneﬁts
a team most.
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11 Introduction
In a recent experimental study Gächter and Renner (2004) illustrate the me-
chanics of “leading by example”. In a team of agents one team member acts
as leader by choosing his eﬀort prior to all others. Gächter and Renner ob-
serve that the leader’s eﬀort inﬂuences the eﬀort choice of all team members.
The higher the leader’s eﬀort, the higher the eﬀort of the other team mem-
bers. Strikingly, this holds even though there are no monetary incentives that
would induce such complementarities. Nevertheless, team members moving
at the second stage follow the example set by their leader–which, in fact,
reduces their monetary payoﬀ.1 Consequently, “bold” leadership, i.e. exert-
ing high eﬀorts as a ﬁrst mover, can be beneﬁcial, both for the leader and
the team as a whole.
In this paper we suggest a way of modeling such leadership mechanics
and show how leadership can arise endogenously. Our model is driven by the
assumption that some agents might dislike eﬀort diﬀerentials. For obvious
reasons we shall call such agents, who have a tendency to be inﬂuenced by
their peers, “conformists”. A tendency of agents to match eﬀorts of their
peers has been documented in various recent empirical studies. For example,
Falk and Ichino (2003) document peer eﬀects in a controlled ﬁeld experiment
and Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2004) observe strong peer eﬀects among
fruit pickers.
In team production that we study here conformism turns out to be a two-
edged sword. While it tends to reduce eﬀorts of highly productive agents
it tends to increase the eﬀorts of less productive agents. Nevertheless, we
can show that teams always beneﬁt (weakly) from exogenously imposed or
1Remarkably, Gächter and Renner make this observation even for one-shot games.
2endogenously arising leadership. Material output and payoﬀsa r eh i g h e ri n
the presence of a leader.
Furthermore we show that endogenous leadership arises if and only if there
is at least one team member who is a conformist and we analyze whose lead-
ership is most desirable. Interestingly, it turns out that, everything else being
equal, team output is maximized if the least productive agent takes on the
role of team leader. Moreover, if agents vary in their degree of conformism,
team output is maximized if a comparative non-conformist is leader.
Previous theoretical attempts to model leadership have invoked asymmet-
ric information. In Hermalin’s (1998) model leaders have private information
about the team’s productivity and, thus, can signal the team’s productivity
by their eﬀort choice. While this is an extremely plausible model, it can-
not explain Gächter and Renner’s data where information is symmetric and,
indeed, complete.
This note is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce two sim-
p l es t a t i cm o d e l sw i t ht w oa g e n t sw h e r et h et i m i n go fa g e n t s ’e ﬀort choices
is exogenous. We show that sequential moves, i.e., having a leader always
increases outputs as long as there is at least one conformist in the team.
Furthermore, we demonstrate the main comparative statics results in this
section. In Section 3 we allow for endogenous timing, following the mod-
elling approach of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). We show that, whenever at
least one agent is a conformist, agents will indeed choose eﬀort sequentially,
increasing team output. Section 4 concludes.
32 Exogenous timing
Consider two agents i =1 ,2 who produce some joint output that they share
equally. Each agent chooses some eﬀort xi ≥ 0. For simplicity, let the output,
y, be linear in eﬀorts, i.e.,
y =2 ( k1x1 + k2x2) (1)
where ki ≥ 0 is agent i’s constant productivity.23 Also for simplicity, we
assume that the physical cost of exerting eﬀort is quadratic such that agent










Materially eﬃcient production is therefore reached if agents choose xEFF
i =
2ki which, as we know from Holmström (1982) and will see in some detail
below, they will not do with standard preferences. The eﬃcient total output
is yEFF =4 ( k2
1 + k2
2).
In our model, an agent’s utility depends on his material payoﬀ and may
depend on the diﬀerence between the agent’s eﬀo r ta n dt h ee ﬀort of his peer.
More speciﬁcally, let





where (xi − xj)2 measures eﬀort diﬀerences and bi ≥ 0 measures agent i’s
degree of conformism.4 Standard preferences are obtained as a special case
of (3) for bi =0 .
2One might argue that team production is more likely to occur when eﬀorts are comple-
mentary. However this complicates the algebra while our main qualitative results remain
robust.
3Notice that in Gächter and Renner (2004) k1 = k2.
4In this environment, similar utility functions can be justiﬁed with other social prefer-
ences, for example, a variant of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) inequality aversion. In their
42.1 No leadership: Simultaneous moves
Now suppose that eﬀorts are chosen simultaneously at some given point in






It is easy to see that eﬀorts are strategically independent only for bi =0 ,
the standard case. However, with conformism eﬀorts become strategic com-







for i =1 ,2 and i 6= j.( 5 )









= sign (kj − ki) (6)
In words, the more productive agent’s eﬀort is decreasing in his own
conformism and increasing in the other agent’s conformism and vice versa
for the less productive agent. The intuition for this result is simple. In order
to reduce diﬀerences in eﬀorts, agents adjust their eﬀort choice towards the
eﬀo r t so fo t h e r s .T h u s ,t h em o r ep r o d u c t i v ea g e n tl o w e r sh i se ﬀort. And the
model agents receive a utility penalty that depends linearly on the diﬀerence between
agents’ material payoﬀs. Since πi − πj = 1
2(x2
j − x2








“non-conformism penalty” can be obtained from their inequality penalty by normalizing
with respect to total eﬀort and taking the square. However, in more complex environ-
ments conformism and this form of inequality aversion do not necessarily coincide. Notice
also that conformism, as we model it here, does not depend on symmetry. Agents care
about choosing similar actions despite poetentially diﬀerent productivities. In a richer
model, the degree of conformism could also depend on how similar or diﬀerent agents are.
In the context of a principal-agent problem such an approach is taken, for example, by
Hehenkamp and Kaarboe (2004).
5more conformist he is the more he will lower it. On the other hand, the less
productive agent increases his eﬀort. Again the size of this adjustment is
increasing in the degree of his conformism.





2(1 + b1)+( b1 + b2)k1k2
1+b1 + b2
.( 7 )
Again we can take ﬁrst derivatives in order to analyze the eﬀect of con-





= sign (kj − ki).( 8 )
In words, total output is increasing in the less productive agent’s conformism
and decreasing in the more productive agent’s conformism. Notice that
any (moderate) increase in output implies increased material eﬃciency. If
agents are equally productive, conformism has no eﬀe c to np r o d u c t i o ni nt h e
simultaneous-move equilibrium.
2.2 Exogenous leadership: Sequential moves
Let us now assume that agents decide about their eﬀorts sequentially, the
second mover knowing the ﬁrst mover’s choice.5 Notationwise, let agent 1
be the ﬁrst mover and agent 2 the second mover. Solving by backwards
5This does not necessarily require that agents work at totally separated times. Rather
i tm i g h tb et h a tt h eﬁrst agent starts a little earlier than the second and that there is some
inertia when eﬀorts are exerted over time. In fact, when eﬀorts are exerted over time there
will always be an element of sequentiality as long as agents can observe what others are
doing. Assuming two periods and a simple leader-follower structure is just a convenient
way of capturing this.
6induction it is obvious that agent 2 has to choose his eﬀort according to (4),
i.e., x2(x1)=k2+b2x1
1+b2 . Anticipating this, the ﬁrst agent maximizes




















k1(1 + b2)2 + k2(b1 + b2 + b2
2)
(1 + b2)2 + b1
(10)
















We have seen above that under simultaneous moves with conformism,
the more productive agent has an incentive to reduce his eﬀo r tw h i l et h el e s s
productive agent has an incentive to increase his eﬀort. Let us refer to this
as the pure conformity eﬀect. It still applies here. But with sequential play
there is a second eﬀect to which we refer as the commitment eﬀect.S i n c e
eﬀorts are strategic complements, the ﬁr s tm o v e rk n o w st h a tb yi n c r e a s i n g
his eﬀo r th ew i l la l s oi n c r e a s et h ee ﬀort of the second mover. This implies
that his return on eﬀort is greater than under simultaneous moves. This
commitment eﬀect is always positive. However, if the more productive agent
moves ﬁrst, his level of conformism must not be too great because otherwise
the negative conformity eﬀect can outweigh the positive commitment eﬀect.
The relative sizes of the pure conformity and commitment eﬀects are
crucial for a comparison of output under simultaneous play and output under
sequential play. The intuition we gained from above tells us that sequential
7play will be particularly good if the two eﬀects are aligned, i.e., when the less
productive agent moves ﬁr s t( b e c a u s eh ew i l li n c r e a s eh i se ﬀort due to both





(k1 + k1b2 + k2b2)(b1k1 + k2b2 + k2)
(1 + 2b2 + b2
2 + b1)(1+b1 + b2)
(13)
shows, since all parameters are positive, that the commitment eﬀect always
exceeds the conformity eﬀect as long as the second mover shows a minimal
tendency toward conformism.6
Examining (13) also reveals that, everything else being equal, it is always
better for the team if the less productive agent moves ﬁrst. For agents with
equal (or similar productivity) it is, furthermore, better when the one who
is more independent (that is, less conformist) moves ﬁrst.7
Result 1 Output with leadership always (weakly) exceeds output under si-
multaneous play. If the second mover is prone to conformism this holds
strictly. Moreover, for agents equally prone to conformism, the less
productive agent is preferable as leader. Finally, for equally productive
agents, the agent who is less prone to conformism is the leader who
maximizes output.





2+1. Hence, while there is no eﬀect of conformism with equal produc-
tivities and simultaneous moves, our model does predict positive eﬀects of leadership in a
sequential-move game even if productivities are identical.
7The ﬁrst claim can be easily established by substituting k2 in (13) by k1 + δ and
then taking the ﬁrst derivative w.r.t. δ. For the second claim one can simply normalize




83E n d o g e n o u s t i m i n g
In the absence of a ﬁrm owner and principal who implements a leadership
structure, it seems unclear how the agents themselves should decide about
the order of moves and the issue arises whether agents are able to achieve
the beneﬁts of sequential play. Of course, they might be able to engage in
some bargaining prior to choosing their eﬀorts. But if they are able to reach
binding agreements, the free rider problem should disappear in any case.
Thus, we here outline what will happen in the probably more realistic and
more interesting case when they cannot reach binding agreements.
An a t u r a lw a yt oﬁnd an answer to this question is to model the agents’
problem as a game with endogenous timing. Here we adapt Hamilton and
Slutsky’s (1990) framework which studies the emergence of Stackelberg lead-
ership in (market) games. Let there be two periods, t =1 ,2.I n t h e ﬁrst
period, agents either exert some eﬀort or decide to wait. This happens si-
multaneously. In the second period agents who have decided to wait, learn
what happened in t =1and then choose their eﬀort. Applying backward
induction, we ﬁnd, similar to Hamilton and Slutsky, that there are three
subgame perfect equilibria, one symmetric and two asymmetric ones. In the
symmetric SPE, both agents choose xSIM
i in t =1 . In the two asymmetric
SPE, one of the agents chooses x
SEQ
1 in t =1while the other waits and
chooses x
SEQ
2 in t =2 .89
As Hamilton and Slutsky, we can deselect the ﬁrst symmetric equilibrium
because it is in weakly dominated strategies. Simply notice that if the other
8Oﬀ the equilibrium path, agents simply play best replies.
9To see that the latter are indeed equilibria notice that the agent who moves ﬁrst picks
his best point on the other agent’s response function. Thus, x
SEQ
1 is a best reply to the
other’s waiting strategy.
9player chooses an eﬀort in t =1 , an agent is always weakly better oﬀ by
waiting since he can then play the best reply against this eﬀort in t =2 .
Moreover, if the other waits, waiting too is equally good as playing xSIM
i in
t =1as in both cases, both agents eventually choose xSIM
i . Hence, waiting
can never be worse than playing xSIM
i in t =1and is sometimes better.
Thus, we should expect one of the two asymmetric equilibria where agents
move indeed sequentially.
We refrain from selecting a unique solution.10 Instead we observe that,
with endogenous timing, agents will always achieve (weakly) higher output
than when forced to play simultaneously. (This follows immediately from the
ﬁr s tp a r to fR e s u l t1a b o v e . )
Result 2 If the timing of eﬀort choices is endogenous and at least one
agent is a conformist, agents will choose their eﬀorts sequentially which
strictly increases material eﬃciency.
Notice that we assume that the leader-follower structure emerges because
agents maximize utility and not their material payoﬀ. However, as we see in
Result 2 this will also increase their material payoﬀs. Thus, we see that, when
timing is endogenous, teams with at least agent who is a conformist have a
substantial advantage over teams where agents have standard preferences.
In contrast to standard agents, agents with positive b’s will beneﬁtf r o mt h e
endogenously emerging leader-follower structure.
10For Hamilton and Slutsky’s game, van Damme and Hurkens (1999) provide a unique
solution applying Harsanyi-Selten style equilibrium selection arguments.
104 Incomplete information
So far, we have always assumed that both, agents’ productivities as well
as agents’ degrees of conformism, are commonly known. This is obviously
a heroic assumption and the question arises whether or not the results are
robust if there is some incomplete information. Since, arguably, productiv-
ities are much easier to observe in the setting that we have in mind, the
more pressing question is what would happen if agents have to face some
uncertainty about their partners’ degree of conformism. While a full-ﬂedged
analysis of this problem would go far beyond the scope of this paper we did
analyze the robustness of our results for the special case of equal produc-
tivities k (which is, in fact, the setup of Gächter and Renner 2004) and two
possible values of b, zero and a strictly positive b. The common prior attaches
probability p to the latter type, and 1 − p to the former (the standard type
of economic theory).
With equal productivities we know that conformism has only bite if agents
move sequentially and this, of course, remains true in the presence of in-
complete information: both agents simply choose xi = k when they move
simultaneously. With sequential moves the analysis becomes slightly more
tedious but remains essentially straightforward. The analysis is greatly sim-
pliﬁed through the observation that the type of the ﬁrst mover is completely
irrelevant for the second mover who only cares about the ﬁrst mover’s action.
Hence, signalling is not an issue and there is a unique sequential equilibrium.
(Some algebraic results are contained in the appendix.) Also, for p → 1 this
equilibrium converges to the equilibrium of the game with complete informa-
tion where b1 = b2 = b. What is more, output under sequential moves again
exceeds output under simultaneous moves, for all parameters.
11The analysis of the game with incomplete information and endogenous
timing is a little more elaborate but it turns out that the results we obtained
above do again carry over. (See also the appendix.) In particular, there are
sequentially rational equilibria with endogenous leadership. However, now
there are two possible types of such equilibria–equilibria where, say, agent
1m o v e sﬁrst regardless of his b and agent 2 waits regardless of his b (or vice
versa) and equilibria where the decision when to move is a function of b.I t
turns out that both types of equilibria coexist. First of all, the equilibria of
the complete information case where leadership depends on the identity of
agents are robust. In the game with incomplete information there are always
asymmetric equilibria where, say, agent 1 moves ﬁrst and agent 2 waits. In
addition, there is also a symmetric equilibrium where high types with b =
b move ﬁrst and low types with b =0wait. Of course, in this equilibrium
where the conformists become leaders and complete non-conformists follow-
ers, production is just as under simultaneous moves. Due to the insensitivity
of the (endogenous) follower, there is neither a conformity nor a commitment
eﬀect. And the more desirable symmetric outcome where the non-conformist
becomes the endogenous leader and the conformist the follower is, as it turns
out, not an equilibrium. The reason for this is that a conformist has an in-
centive to deviate and move ﬁrst since there is a chance that the other agent
is a conformist, too, who can be stipulated to work harder if the deviating
agent decides to lead by example.
The bottom line is that, in this simple model of incomplete information,
endogenous leadership is predicted to arise but will only be beneﬁcial for the
team if agents coordinate on one of the asymmetric equilibria where the ﬁrst
agent leads regardless of his type.
125C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have illustrated a model that captures the mechanics of
“leading by example” documented in recent experiments (Gächter and Ren-
ner 2004). The model takes as its central assumptions one of the key results
of Gächter and Renner’s study, namely that agents exhibit a substantial de-
gree of conformism, i.e., a tendency to reduce eﬀort diﬀerentials even if this
is costly for them. We show that with such conformism leadership is al-
ways beneﬁcial for the team. Moreover, we show that leadership need not be
imposed exogenously. When at least one agent is prone to conformism, lead-
ership will, in fact, arise endogenously. Moreover, we show that, somewhat
counterintuitive, teams should select the least productive agent as leader.
This is because then the incentives induced through a pure conformity eﬀect
and a commitment eﬀect are aligned. Finally, for equally productive agents,
it is better for the team to have a “free spirit”, i.e. somebody who is less
prone to conformism, as leader.
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Appendix
In this appendix we sketch the equilibrium solutions of the game with
exogenous sequential moves and incomplete information and the game with
endogenous timing and incomplete information.
The game with exogenous sequential moves can be solved by simple back-
ward induction (since the ﬁrst mover only inﬂuences the second mover’s pay-





14in the second period regardless of what the ﬁrst mover did. The high type








As ﬁrst movers both types would utilize the commitment eﬀect. Speciﬁcally,





























This also describes what would happen in one of the asymmetric equilibria
of the game with endogenous timing, where one of the agents becomes leader
because of his “name”.
We conclude this appendix by mentioning the ﬁrst-period eﬀo r tt h a ta
high type would choose deviating from a proposed symmetric outcome where
low types move ﬁrst and high types second. The optimal deviation would



















− 3b + b
3
p − 1
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